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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------------------------GEORGE W. FRAME and LORY
HERBISON FRAME,
Appellants,

)

-vs-

Case No.

RESIDENCY APPEALS
COMMITTEE OF UTAH STATE
UNIVERSITY, CLAUDE J.
OPENSHAW, Chairman, and
EVAN J. SORENSON, Assistant
Director of Admissions and
Records,

18097

)

)

)
Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

----------------------------------------------------------INTRODUCTION
This action was filed with the Utah Supreme Court
seeking judicial review and reversal of the decision of the
First Judicial District Court, the Honorable VeNoy
Christofferson, whereby appellants' Motion for Surrunary
Judgment was denied and respondents' Motion for Surrunary
Judgment was granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants do not agree with the Statement of
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·Facts recited by respondents-in their brief, and refer the
court to the Statement of Facts as stated in appellants'
initial brief to the court.
Appellants specifically wish to point out that
appellants returned to Utah, after being in Africa, and
registered at Utah State University in March of 1978, not
September of 1978 as stated by respondents in their Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RATIONAL RELATIONSHIP TEST IS NOT
THE PROPER STANDARD FOR ANALYZING AN
IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION.
Appellants' Complaint against respondents for
refusing to classify them as residents of Utah State
University (hereinafter "USU") alleges an unconstitutional
denial of both equal protection and due process.
Respondents' brief indicates that the only
relevant standard to be employed by the court in determining
the constitutionality of Section I. (D) of the Rules and
Regulations for Determining Resident Status in the Utah
System of Higher Education (hereinafter the "30-day rule")
is the rational relationship test.

This test is described

in respondents' brief, at p.12, by quoting a phrase from
Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
The quoted from Weber, supra, in respondents'
brief is clearly limited to constitutional challenges under

2
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the Equal Protection Clause.
supra, is:

The entire quote from Weber,

"The tests to determine the validity of state

statutes under the Equal Protection Clause have been
variously expressed, but this court requires, at a minimum,
that a statutory classification bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose".
at 172,

Weber, supra,

(emphasis added).
Appellants agree that the rational relationship

test is the proper test to be employed by the court in
regard to their challenge to the 30-day rule under the Equal
Protection Clause.

In addition to their equal protection

challenge, however, appellants have also challenged the
30-day rule under the Due Process Clause; they respectfully
submit that the proper standard to be used by the court for
analyzing their due process challenge is different from the
rational relationship test described in Weber, supra.
As argued in appellants' initial brief to this
court, the 30-day rule creates an irrebuttable presumption.
It has long been recognized that an irrebuttable presumption
is a violation of the Due Process Clause.

Cleveland Board

of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645

(1972).
[I]t is forbidden by the Due Process
Clause to deny an individual the
resident rates on the basis of a
permanent and irrebuttable presumption
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3

of nonresidence, when that presumption
is not necessarily or universally true
in fact, and when the State has
reasonable alternative means of making
the crucial determination. Vlandis
supra, at 452 (emphasis added).
In analyzing appellants' due process challenge,
then, it would be improper for the court to use the rational
relationship test, as advocated by respondents, because that
is an equal protection standard.

Rather, the court must use

the test enunciated in Stanley, supra, Vlandis, supra, and
LaFleur, supra.

That type of analysis is explained as

follows in Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 F. Supp.
5 4 1 , at 5 5 4

( D • Md . 19 7 6 ) :

In this case, then, several questions
relative to plaintiffs' due process
claim must be resolved:
(1)
does the
University of Maryland's "In-State Policy"
create an irrebuttable presumption ... (2)
if so, is that presumption appropriate
because universally true?
(3)
if not,
can the defendants so justify that
presumption as to save it from
unconstitutionality?
By using the correct test for appellants' due
process challenge to the 30-day rule, the only appropriate
conclusion is that the 30-day rule creates an irrebuttable
presumption which is an unconstitutional violation of the
Due Process Clause.

See Point I, Brief of Appellants.

4
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POINT II.
THE 30-DAY RULE IS NOT RATIONALLY
RELATED TO A LEGITIMATE STATE
PURPOSE.
In the area of social welfare and econom1cs, the
proper test for judging an equal protection challenge to a
statute or regulation is whether the classification 1s
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

This, then, 1s

the standard to be applied here to appellants' equal
protection challenge to the 30-day rule, although it 1s not
the proper standard for their due process challenge.
Even given this minimal equal protection standard,
the 30-day rule fails to pass constitutional muster.
Appellants recognize that it is legitimate for respondents
to differentiate between resident and non-resident tuition
at USU.

The 30-day rule, however, must fall under an equal

protection challenge because the rule is so unreasonable and
so senseless that it is not even rationally related to
respondents' purpose of maintaining the tuition
differentiation.
In order to prevent non-residents from taking
advantage of the lower resident tuition, respondents require
a person who comes to Utah for the primary purpose of
attending an institution of higher education to reside in
Utah for a least one year before he/she can possibly be

5
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considered a resident for tuition purposes.

Appellants do

not challenge the reasonableness of such a rule.
Appellants do, however, contend that it is totally
unreasonable for respondents to impose the additional
requirement on applicants for resident status that, during
that one year, they be absolutely precluded from being
physically absent from the State for more than 30 days.
There is no reason to assume that a person who
leaves the State for more than 30 days is not a resident.
Possible legitimate reasons for such absences include
temporary employment, research related to one's studies,
participation in special educational programs offered only
in other states, or joining a branch of the military.

All

of these examples show legitimate reasons why a Utah
resident might be absent from the State for more than 30
days and yet still be a bona fide Utah resident.

It is not

only unfair, but totally illogical, to strip all persons who
leave the State for more than 30 days of resident student
status.
The irrationality of the 30-day rule is furthered
by its irrefutable nature.

A student who has not yet been

in Utah for one year and who has left Utah for more than 30
days is allowed no opportunity to present evidence that
his/her absence has not negated his/her residency.

6
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This irrationality is evident when one examines
appellants' situation.

The running of the one contir1uous

year's presence within the State has been broken by their
summer trips to other parts of the country.

These trips

have been for one or both of two purposes - studi~s and
employment.
·Both appellants are in the field of wildlife
science.

Because of the fact that certain kinds of wildlife

exist only in certain areas of the country or the world,
appellants have found it necessary to travel to places such
as Africa and New Jersey to do the research required for
their studies.

Yet this necessity has automatically

deprived them of any chance to attain resident student
status.
Appellants' trips out-of-state were also, at
times, for the purpose of employment.

They were engaged, at

various times, in doing slide shows and lectures about their
studies, and in researching and writing articles on wildlife
for a children's magazine.
The 30-day rule specifically mentions employment
out-of-state as being an indicia of non-residence.
assumption is absurd.

Such an

Many students take surruner jobs, if

possible, to help defray the costs of their educations.
Those students, especially graduate level students often
attempt to find employment in their area of study even if

7
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-

i

they must go to a different state for that employment; they

.,,_

realize that any extra knowledge and experience they gain
through a summer job in their fields will help them when
competing for employment once their education is completed.
To penalize students such as appellants for trying to help
themselves in this way is certainly irrational.

:u-;,·1b

POINT III.
NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EXISTS TO
SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT APPELLANTS
ARE NOT RESIDENTS.
Respondents, in the brief, argue that substantial
evidence existed to support their administrative decision in
which they denied appellants' applications for resident
status.

Therefore, respondents argue, their decision was

not arbitrary and capricious.
Appellants respectfully submit that respondents'
decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that
it was, indeed, arbitrary and capricious.

See Point III,

Appellants' Brief.
In their brief, respondents also cite the case of
Michelson v. Cox, 476 F. Supp. 1315 (S.D. Iowa 1979), and
argue that Michelson and the present case are substantially
alike, and that this court should, like the Michelson court,
affirm the administrative finding of non-residency.
The Michelson case, supra, is easily
distinguishable from the case at bar here.

In Michelson,
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the presumption of non-residency was reb:1tt;ible, capable of

being over~ome; on the other hand, the presumµtion of
non-residency created by the 30-day rule in the present cdse
is not rebuttable.

This major difference distinguishes

Michelson significantly from the present case.

Appellants,

therefore, respectfully submit that the Michelson case is
not relevant to the court's decision in the present case.
CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully submit that the decision
below should be reversed and appellants be granted the
relief requested in their brief.
DATED this

2.;~

days of November, 1982.

Respectfully Submitted:
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.

Attorney for Appellants
J

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the above REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to Michael
Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Attorney for Respondents,
President's Office, Old Main, Room 116, U.M.C. 14, Uta~
State University, Logan Utah, via first class U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid this 2~ day of November, 1982.

~kDA
TAYLOR
Secretary
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

